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The UN Committee of 24’s Dogmatic Philosophy 
of Recognition: Toward a Sui Generis Approach 
to Decolonization 
‘What we need now are creative solutions for the remaining Non-Self-Governing Territories. If the 
United Nations is to fulfil its obligations in supporting the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of 
these Territories, a pragmatic and realistic approach- taking into account the specific 
circumstances of each- is most likely to lead to concrete results.’ - Ban Ki-Moon, former UN 
Secretary General1 
Abstract:  
The time is ripe for the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (the Committee of 24) 
to accept sui generis categories to enable it to achieve its aim of ‘finishing the job’ of 
decolonization. This would mean a departure from the Committee of 24’s rigid adherence to the 
three forms of decolonization recognised by it - independence, integration and free association. 
This article adopts Gilles Deleuze’s critiques of the ‘dogmatic philosophy of recognition’ and how 
this can be overcome through his articulation of ‘the Encounter’ to interrogate the philosophical 
basis of the Committee of 24’s inability to recognise sui generis forms of decolonization. It is 
through the Encounter that the rigid adherence to the categories is challenged such that sui 
generis categories are created in furtherance of the Committee’s stated aim. In applying this 
theoretical analysis, the article uses Gibraltar as a nascent example of what a sui generis category 
of decolonization could look like.   
  
                                                             
1 UN General Assembly, ‘Secretary General Hails 2010 as Landmark Year for Special Committee on 
Decolonization’, (25 February 2010, GA/COL/3199)  
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It is high time that the Committee of 24 recognises sui generis forms of decolonization. That the 
last decade has seen zero territories graduate from the UN’s list of Non-Self-Governing 
Territories (‘NSGT’) has been attributed to the political, institutional but also conceptual 
shortcomings of the Committee.2 This article deploys Deleuze’s philosophy of recognition to 
provide an account of the Committee’s inadequate understanding of decolonization and the 
current stasis the seventeen listed territories on its list find themselves in.  
Ban Ki-Moon’s 2010 statement was delivered at the end of the UN’s Second International 
Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism and the 15th anniversary of the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 1514(XV),3 the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, whose progeny, the Committee of 24, is tasked with its implementation. Several years 
on, and the Committee is now in the Third International Decade for the Eradication of 
Colonialism (2011-20) with seventeen territories still on the UN’s list of Non-Self-Governing 
Territories who remain targets of decolonization efforts.  Paradoxically, many of those 
territories have high levels of internal self-government, with some having exercised plebiscites 
to maintain particular constitutional arrangements under the sovereignty of independent states. 
Demands for delisting based on these realities have typically received neither the assent nor 
recognition of the Committee of 24.   
Significantly however, the former UN Secretary General’s address to the Committee of 24 spoke 
of greater overtures that, whether intended or not, ostensibly problematized the three fixed 
                                                             
2 Oliver Turner, ‘Finishing the Job: the UN Special Committee on Decolonization and the politics of self-
governance’ (2013) 34,7 Third World Quarterly 1193-1208; Peter Gold, ‘Gibraltar at the United Nations: 
Caught between a treaty, the charter and the ‘fundamentalism’ of the special committee’ (2009) 20, 4 
Democracy and Statecraft 697-715 
3 The legality of the resolution, as with all General Assembly Resolutions, is contingent on wording of the 
text, the voting record, statements made during the adoption of the resolution and post factum state 
practice. Helen Quane, ‘The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-Determination’ (1998) 47 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 551 
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categories of decolonization- integration or free association with an independent state or 
independence- as static and rigid. A deconstruction of the former Secretary General’s statement 
appears to challenge the anticipatory nature of the fixed categories of decolonisation. These 
modus operandi intend to forestall all the possible manifestations of decolonization but those 
which it does not recognise under either of its three categories, do not satisfy the requisites of 
decolonization. Alternatively, the statement above posits the primacy of ‘specific circumstances’ 
that warrant ‘a pragmatic and realistic approach’ rather than the subsumption of ‘specific 
circumstances’ by the three fixed categories of decolonization. This is the sui generi approach to 
recognition of decolonization. It is through the primacy of the circumstances, rather than their 
subsumption by the fixed categories of decolonization, that new sui generis forms of 
decolonization may emerge which is ‘likely to lead to concrete results.’ 
The limits of the Committee of 24’s work have been variously discussed and provide important 
contributions as to the institutional and political limitations frustrating attainment of its 
objectives These pertain to i) its narrow understandings of colonialism, ii) its similarly narrow 
understandings of decolonisation and iii) the institutional and political constraints on the 
Committee.4 On this latter point, it has been claimed that the Committee is beleaguered by the 
‘North-South Theatre’ in which ‘point-scoring’ play out between the primarily Global South 
dominated Committee of 24 against the primarily Global North Administering Powers of the 
seventeen listed territories.5 While it is acknowledged that there has been some fracturing of 
the dichotomy, it is also the case that the division between the global north and south remains a 
reality in many facets of global law and politics.6  
                                                             
4 Oliver Turner, ‘Finishing the Job: the UN Special Committee on Decolonization and the politics of self-
governance’ (2013) 34,7 Third World Quarterly 1193-1208; Peter Gold, ‘Gibraltar at the United Nations: 
Caught between a treaty, the charter and the ‘fundamentalism’ of the special committee’ (2009) 20, 4 
Democracy and Statecraft 697-715  
5
 Oliver Turner, ‘Finishing the Job: the UN Special Committee on Decolonization and the politics of self-
governance’ (2013) 34,7 Third World Quarterly 1193-1208 
6
Hakeem O. Yusuf, ‘”High Value” Migration and complicity for underdevelopment and corruption in the global 
south – Receiving from the attic’ (2012) 33, 3 Third World Quarterly  441-457, 441-442. 
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This paper seeks to examine the philosophical underpinnings of the Committee’s limitations in 
its understandings of what constitutes decolonization. It begins by outlining the history and 
mission of the Committee of 24 before identifying some of its principal shortcomings. The paper 
then problematizes the limits of the narrow understanding- or fixed categories- of 
decolonization utilised by the Committee of 24 through a philosophical interrogation. It does 
this by applying Deleuze’s critique of the ‘philosophy of recognition’ as the basis on which the 
Committee of 24 operates and then identifies the demerits of that basis. The paper then uses 
Gibraltar to illustrate how engaging Deleuze’s Encounter would privilege the territory’s form of 
self-government and plebiscites in the normative assessment and subsequent establishment of 
new categories of decolonization, by challenging the Committee’s dogmatic philosophy of 
recognition. The case study recognises that though certain constitutional reforms need to be 
made- hence toward a sui generis status- Gibraltar is apt for establishing a more amenable, 
open-ended category of decolonization in the future which facilitates the aim of the Committee 
of 24 in ‘finishing the job’7 of decolonization.  
1. The History and Mission of the Committee of 24 
The end of the Second World War was transformative for both Europe and the World. It 
appeared to mark the beginning of international co-operation after centuries of warring 
empires and presaged a new humanism, crafted under the auspices of the United Nations 
Charter which centred international peace, security, fundamental human rights and dignity as 
part of its project.8 It was also a period of rapid decolonization from the great Imperial powers 
of Europe. However, certain territories remained in the throes of colonial governance. Chapter 
XI, Article 73 of the 1945 UN Charter9 contained the ‘Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing 
Territories’ which placed obligations on the administering powers of those territories ‘to 
promote to the utmost…the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories’ as well as ‘to 
                                                             
7 ‘The United Nations and Decolonization’  
<http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/specialcommittee.shtml> accessed 02 November 2017 
8 Charter of the United Nations, Preamble (adopted signed on 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 
1945) 
9 Charter of the United Nations (adopted signed on 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 
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develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to 
assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the 
particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of 
advancement.’ 
 
From around the 1960’s, the number of territories that had become decolonized (and therefore 
de-listed), began to drop for the first time.10 The 14th and 15th of December 1960 however, were 
to prove particularly important dates in the history of decolonization. On the 14th, the General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 1514(XV) entitled the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples11 which recognised the previously vague 
principle of self-determination,12 that ‘the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of 
colonialism in all its manifestations’ demanding ‘immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and 
Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained 
independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions 
or reservations.’ A day later, Resolution 1541(XV) entitled the Principles which should guide 
members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transfer the information called for 
under Article 73e of the Charter13 was passed by the General Assembly. A major impetus for 
these developments was the fact that a number of former colonial territories had by then joined 
the United Nations. The interest of these new member states in decolonization made a 
                                                             
10 Turner, supra note 5, at 1198  
11 UNGA Res 1514 (1960) U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16 
12 Self-determination is also recognised in Articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter, Article 1 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Article 1 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 and considered a part of customary international law by the 
Namibia Advisory Opinion I.C.J., Advisory Opinion, 1971, I.C.J. Rep 16; See also Helen Quane, ‘The United 
Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-Determination’ (1998) 47 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 537-572 
13 UNGA Res 1541 (1960) GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16. This entails the requirement on the 
Administering power of the territory to issue annual reports to the Committee Secretariat 
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significant difference to the hitherto declared but lamely pursued commitment of the United 
Nations to the cause.14 
Importantly, Resolution 1541(XV) set out three ways in which a NSGT is said to have reached 
full self-government (‘decolonization’) and achieve subsequent de-listing. These are 
independence, free association with an independent state, or integration with an independent 
state. In 1961, the UN set up the Committee of 2415 through Resolution 1654(XVI),16 to monitor 
the implementation of Resolution 1514(XV). It was further tasked to make recommendations as 
to its implementation, conduct annual reviews of NSGTs, hear statements from NSGTs 
representatives, dispatch visiting missions, organize seminars on the political, social and 
economic situation in the Territories, make annual recommendations concerning the 
dissemination of information to mobilize public opinion in support of the decolonization 
process, and observe the ‘Week of Solidarity with the Peoples of Non-Self-Governing 
Territories’.17  
 
The success of the Committee of 24 cannot be understated. In 1945, a third of the world’s 
population were considered to be living under a colonial power. That has now been reduced to 
0.02%.18 However, the rate at which NSGTs have achieved decolonized status in the ways 
circumscribed by Resolution 1541(XV) have all but plateaued since the 1990s. The Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste is the most recent success of the Committee, having gained 
independence from Indonesia back in 2002. In 2010, the Fourth Committee, a separate though 
related body focussing on specific cases of decolonization, peacekeeping, and a reviewing 
special political missions, had described the decolonization process as having arrived at a 
                                                             
14 Bardo Fassbender ‘The Better Peoples of the United Nations? Europe’s Practice and the United Nations’ 
(2004) 15, 5 European Journal of International Law 857, 868-869. 
15 Its full name is the ‘Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’. The ‘24’ refers to the 
number of members it had at one point though this was originally 17 and now stands at 29.  
16 UN GA Res 1654 (1961) GOAR, 16 Sess., Supp. No. 17 
17 ‘The United Nations and Decolonization’  
<http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/specialcommittee.shtml> accessed 02 November 2017 
18 Turner, supra note 5, at 1197 
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‘virtual halt’.19 It argued that it was necessary to evolve ‘a new dynamic’ between collecting 
objective information about the situations in the remaining NSGTs, and to pursue a stronger 
dialogue between them and their administering powers. In the Committee’s most recent annual 
report, submitted to the General Assembly, it stated that it would similarly ‘emphasize the value 
of holding, during the intersessional period, informal consultations with the administering 
Powers and other stakeholders regarding the status of the Non-Self-Governing Territories on 
the Committee’s agenda.’20  
2. The Committee of 24’s Principal Shortcomings 
The inability of the Committee of 24 to finish the job of eradicating colonialism has been 
attributed primarily to its political and institutional failures. Oliver Turner frames the tension 
between the primarily ‘Global-South’21 countries of the Committee of 24 and the primarily 
‘Global-North’22 countries of the administrating powers as actors in the ‘North-South Theatre’.23 
Rather than acting in furtherance of eradicating colonialism, Turner claims that the Committee 
has been used as a proxy forum for point-scoring. States belonging to the Non-Aligned 
Movement or other Southern or so-called ‘third-world’ groupings, have been more interested in 
one-up-man-ship over states belonging to variations of Euro-American alliances, rather than 
creating productive groupings in pursuit of the Committee’s aims. 24  
Turner is quick to acknowledge however, the indeterminacy of the Global –North/-South25 
nomenclature, particularly with reference to where certain countries, such as Russia and China, 
                                                             
19 UN General Assembly, ‘Decolonization Process at ‘Virtual Halt’’, (8 October 2012) 
<https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/gaspd504.doc.htm> accessed 02 November 2017 
20 UN Special Committee on Decolonization (71st Session) ‘Report of the Special Committee on the  
Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples for 2016’ (14 July 2016) UN DOC A/71/23, 21 
21 Including Syria, Iran, India and Cuba 
22 The UK, US, France and New Zealand 
23 T Weiss, ‘ECOSOC and the MDGs: what can be done?’ in R Wilkinson & D Hume (eds), The Millennium 
Development Goals and Beyond (Routledge 2012) 119 
24 Turner, supra note 5, at 1201 
25 Other ‘divisions’ have been attributed to theological diversions, dividing physical geographical regions, 
such as the Great Schism of 1054. However, postcolonial scholars have said that such divisions are 
artificial constructs, created by discourses of power with their originals in colonialism. See Edward Said, 
Orientalism (Penguin Books 1978) 52, 54-7, 155-57  
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would be situated.26 The script of the North-South Theatre therefore means that the Committee 
is often ignorant to cases of colonialism among countries of the Global South27 or overly 
sensitive to what it sees as aberrations in the territories under the administration of Global 
North countries, such as Gibraltar and Bermuda- despite both boasting ‘relatively stable and 
effective local administrations and comparatively high levels of GDP per capita’.28 Turner isn’t 
attempting to mitigate the responsibility of the primarily European perpetrators of Imperial and 
Colonial endeavours, but to illustrate the subversion of the Committee’s goals under the politics 
of self-interest of its members.  
Interestingly however, Turner also identifies the theoretical inadequacies of the Committee of 
24, both in its conceptualisations of colonialism and decolonization which inform its work. He 
explains how the Committee’s understanding of colonialism is ‘fundamentally limited and 
broadly unsuited to the 21st century’ as ‘forms of colonial domination are widespread, myriad 
and complex and often persist in alternative guises long after official independence.’29 Drawing 
from International Relations and Critical Geography literature, he describes how colonialism 
can be defined beyond the typical notions of transplantations of settler populations into 
different territories. Colonial power is more than mere physical occupation or ‘conquer and 
rule’30 but ‘operates as an impersonal force through a multiplicity of sites and channels, through 
which the impersonal forces may still linger in the absence of a discernible colonizer’.31 What 
could be described as the ‘reformulations of colonial power’ or colonialism as ‘trans-historical’32  
have also been engaged by lawyers. Nathaniel Berman illustrates how the imperial imagination 
has the ability to reinvent itself under changing conditions33 and how the failure to notice 
structural continuities may hasten us to overestimate the extent to which modern international 
                                                             
26 Turner, supra note 5, at 1202 
27 Ibid., at 1203 
28 Ibid., at 1203 
29 Ibid., at 1194 
30 Ibid., at 1199 
31 Law Wing Sang, Collaborative Colonial Power: The Making of Hong Kong Chinese, Hong Kong, (Hong 
Kong University Press 2009) 3 
32 A Ahmed, ‘The politics of literary postcoloniality’ (1995) 36, 3 Race and Class 9 




law has broken away from its imperial past.34 For example, some scholars contend that the UN 
Charter’s exceptions to the general proscription of the use of force against the political or 
territorial integrity of a state, or the contemporary international trusteeship system are covers 
for colonial endeavours which have been ‘reimagined’. 35  
Particularly relevant here is what Turner recognises as the conceptual limitation in the 
Committee of 24’s understandings of decolonization, by virtue of which it accepts ‘only one of 
three predetermined outcomes’ as satisfying its criteria delisting. This approach, Turner points 
out, is the product of the North-South ensemble which has meant the Committee of 24 thereby 
has 
 established a singular ideology as authoritative fact before granting an opportunity for 
debate…the Committee therefore imposes upon people of a certain legitimate 
persuasion the task of proving themselves worthy of their opinion because the forum 
they enter- rather than that of an ‘honest broker’- is fundamentally biased against them. 
Just as colonial powers have traditionally spoken for the people they control, so the 
Special Committee renders the inhabitants of NSGTs voiceless to the extent that it 
dictates what their futures should entail.36 
This paper picks up from Turner’s theoretical observations as to the insufficiencies of the three 
categories of decolonisation. The conventional modus operandi of free association, integration 
or independence, affirmed in Resolution 1541(XV) stymie the Committee’s attainment of its 
objectives because of its philosophical underpinnings. The philosophical underpinnings of the 
Committee are characterised, it is now argued, by a dogmatic philosophy of recognition which 
produces conceptual cul-de-sacs that prevent further decolonisation.   
 
                                                             
34 Ibid., at 1542 
35 Ibid., at 1521- 1561; See also Anne Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the 
Use of Force in International Law (CUP 2009) 18-37; Gustavo Gozzi, ‘The “Discourse” of International Law 
and Humanitarian Intervention’ (2017) 30, 2 Ratio Juris 186-204 




3. Deleuze, the Philosophy of Recognition and tThe Encounter 
This section argues that the operation of the Committee of 24 and its 3 modus operandi of 
decolonization is predicated on a dogmatic philosophy of recognition. Recall that the main issue 
here with the Committee’s approach to its work is its choice of parameters for recognising a 
territory as being decolonized. If philosophy is about resisting and disposing of doxa, then a 
philosophy of recognition, according to Deleuze, is wholly inadequate.  A philosophy of 
recognition is ‘an approach that seeks only to recognize…because it a priori assigns a 
representational form to the outside; it presumes that the encountered thing is only another 
identifiable instance of an existing concept’.37 A philosophy of recognitionIt  ‘has based its 
supposed principle upon extrapolation from certain facts, particularly insignificant facts such as 
Recognition, everyday banality in person’.38 Implicit in such an approach, is the suppression of 
concrete reality.39 Philosophy therefore, has never really busied itself with truth but instead 
with establishing the conditions for a ‘truth’ which have been formulated on a principle of 
recognition.  
If philosophy is about resisting and disposing of doxa, then a philosophy of recognition, 
according to Deleuze, is wholly inadequate. The Committee of 24’s approach to decolonization 
can be said to be predicated on a dogmatic philosophy of recognition. Its current criteria can be 
considered a ‘top-down’ or subsumptive approach to decolonization - in that ‘specific 
circumstances’ are ignored to fit NSGTs, if possible, into the 3 fixed categories through 
recognition. This may have been appropriate seventy years ago but has become ill-suited to the 
multifarious and evolving experiences and understandings of self-determination. A problem 
thus arises from the adoption of the philosophy of recognition by the Committee of 24 because 
of its dogmatism. 
                                                             
37 Alexandre Lefebvre, The Image of Law: Deleuze, Bergson, Spinoza (Stanford University Press, 2008) 60 
38 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (Paul Patton tr, Columbia University Press 1968) 135  
39 This is later discussed in ‘the Encounter’ 
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It is no coincidence that Turner describes the process of delisting of NSGTs as only being 
granted through ‘one of three predetermined outcomes’ or the Committee of 24’s paramount 
problem as ‘dictating what their [NSGT] futures should entail.’ These are all characteristics of 
the anticipatory nature of the philosophy of recognition that imbues the Committee’s 
decolonization approach. In other words, the concepts or more accurately here, categories of 
decolonization from Resolution 1541(XV) attempt to anticipate all different instantiations of 
decolonization. There may be variations within each of the three categories, but those 
differences are still contained within the broader genus of the foundational categories- 
independence, free association or integration. An example of self-government among the NSGTs 
therefore, which doesn’t fit into these broad categories or their finer gradations- as an 
‘identifiable instance’ of the broader categories- simply does not get ‘recognised’ as a 
decolonized territory. This dogmatic philosophy of recognition, which prefigures the categories 
of decolonization, are problematic because many of the territories on the UN List of NSGTs have 
particularly high-levels of government- some akin to independent states- and some have often 
exercised plebiscites to maintain their current constitutional arrangements. 
Deleuze’s claim is that the dogmatic image of thought as a presupposition has plagued 
philosophy since antiquity.40 with Deleuzians stateing that ‘a consistent long-standing set of 
unexamined opinions has haunted and compromised thought since its beginning’.41 Anything 
thought about outside the general concept is not recognised, or its unique differences are 
extinguished. Philosophy as recognition therefore is ‘concept/category centric’. It states that 
conventional epistemologies are typically based on pre-ordained categories which only cognize 
phenomena (or ‘the thing thought about’) as instances of those pre-ordained categories. In 
effect, the thing exists only for the purposes of the concept. Thinking in this way takes place on 
the basis of ‘that which is being thought about’ and its appropriateness within the broader 
category or concept. This is precisely the nature of the approach of the Committee of 24 to its 
                                                             
40 Deleuze, supra 37, at 132 
41 Lefebvre, supra note 36, 60; See also Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (Paul Patton tr, Columbia 
University Press 1968) 147 
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recognised categories of decolonization. Its approach works to exclude specific circumstances of 
territories that have asserted self-determination (even with the concurrence of their former 
colonisers) but are not validated or affirmed as such by the Committee of 24 for not falling into 
its recognised categories.  
 To illustrate the pervasiveness of this approach to thought, Deleuzians explore Aristotle’s 
famous categories and how they in fact articulate an ontology based on a method of division 
that is resistant to unrecognisable phenomena. For example,42 imagine one is confronted with a 
creature that they are initially unfamiliar with. In the determination of what that creature is, one 
may begin with a broad genus of distinction (e.g. “animal”, “plant” or “human”). Once that has 
been established, one may proceed to more ‘finer grained’ subgenera to determine the creature 
(e.g. “with feet,” “without feet”) and continue to descend to finer categories of distinction (e.g., 
“cloven-footed,” “noncloven footed”) until eventually, a determination is arrived at- or teleutaia 
- of what the creature is. This is what captures the ‘essence’ of the thing being thought about. 
However, the categories in Aristotle’s ontology reconciles ‘finer criteria’ within the same 
broader genus. There is only difference within the broader category rather than a new category 
being established to capture the essence of the thing being thought about. So while there 
appears to be difference among the ‘cloven-footed’ and ‘non-cloven-footed’ creature, they are 
still contained within a broader concept of ‘creatures with feet’.  
As Deleuze stated ‘contrariety alone expressed the capacity of a subject to bear opposites while 
remaining substantially the same (in matter or in genus)’.43 Thus difference is only based on an 
opposite, in which both are etymologically linked under the umbrella of a more abstract 
category or concept, preserving the concept’s fixed identity. Where Aristotle may have thought 
he provided an ontology based on categories and difference, Deleuze reads this as ‘the 
                                                             
42 Lefebvre, supra note 36, 63 
43 Deleuze, supra 37, at 30 
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inscription of difference within the identity of the concept’.44 Anything thought about outside the 
general concept is not recognised, or its unique differences are extinguished.  
What Deleuze in effect describes in his critique of Aristotle’s categories is effectively a 
subsumption of difference of the ‘thing being thought about’ to the overarching concept. 
Thinking in this way takes place on the basis of ‘that which is being thought about’ and its 
appropriateness within the broader category or concept. Though these concepts may become 
more ‘finer-grained’ as we descend the taxonomic hierarchy (from animal, to feet/non-feet, to 
cloven/non-cloven feet), differences which are not recognised by the finer gradations of the 
conceptual categories are either ignored (i.e. not recognised) or subsumed (with their non-
recognisable differences extinguished). Difference therefore only occurs in relation to difference 
between things and their appropriateness to the broader categories, rather than difference in 
the thing itself. Anything which is not recognised within the broader or finer categories of the 
taxonomy, does not satisfy such classification.  
 
Deleuze claims that modern philosophy is similarly marred by the banality of ‘recognition’ in 
which unique differences- those not contained within a broader category or concept- are elided. 
On this account, ‘the elementary concepts of representation are the categories defined as the 
conditions of possible experience. These, however, are too general, too large for the real’.45  In 
the Committee of 24’s current approach to decolonization, it has, on the Deleuzian frame of 
analysis, reified its recognised categories as the only possible circumstances for self-
determination in international law, a problematic position, as Ban Ki Moon’s statement above 
emphasised.  
In contemporary philosophy, scientific laws see phenomena as particular expressions of general 
laws. Deleuzian says of Kant, understood as a product of the emergent 18th century scientific 
                                                             
44 Lefebvre, supra note 36, at 64 
45 Deleuze, supra 37, at 68-9 
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method, that ‘at the expense of singular actions, practices, and dispositions, moral law grounds 
us in the arrangement between the general and the particular actions are converted- tested- 
into repeatable particularities of a general more law.’46 Kant’s transcendental judgment for 
example, is just the apprehension of an object which requires an abstraction from all content47- 
or difference. Inhered in the transcendental faculties is an anticipatory element which ‘delimits 
the frame for every possible experience and event before it occurs’.48  Deleuze states that ‘the 
elementary concepts of representation are the categories defined as the conditions of possible 
experience. These, however, are too general, too large for the real’.49   
Philosophy as recognition therefore is ‘concept/category centric’. It states that conventional 
epistemologies are typically based on pre-ordained categories which only cognize phenomena 
(or ‘the thing thought about’) as instances of those pre-ordained categories. In effect, the thing 
exists only for the purposes of the concept. Truth, so understood, is merely recognition, an 
‘identifiable instance of an existing concept’. 
The Deleuzian construction of The Encounter unsettles the is dogmatic process of recognition of 
the sort the Committee of 24 has adopted in its work so far. It The Encounter is an anathema to 
the dogmatic philosophy of recognition- a metaphysical violence.50 It is not about making 
concepts or categories quantitatively (more numerous) or qualitatively (more flexible) 
different, for that would still fall into the dogma of recognition51 which are subsumed under 
fixed (though finer) categories or concepts. The Encounter rather, is about the primacy of that 
which is thought about- or to borrow from Ban-Ki Moon’s statement, ‘specific circumstances’ of 
a territory such as Gibraltar. Encounters exist outside of thought in that they are unrecognizable 
by the concepts or categories. Real thought, according to Deleuze, lies in the primacy of the 
Encounter. By ‘primacy’ therefore, we understand this to be the rejection of recognition, 
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resisting the privileging of the concept or category, and the elevation of the thing being thought 
about- the ‘specific circumstances’. The thing thought about ceases to be an ‘identifiable 
instance’ contained within a concept or category, or an instantiation of a universal law of the 
transcendental conscious, but is unique in and of itself. Whereas ‘concepts only ever designate 
possibilities’, Deleuze describes the Encounter as ‘that which forces thought to raise up and 
educate the absolute necessity of an act of thought or a passion to think.’ 52 This is precisely the 
challenge the Committee of 24 needs to embrace to progress its work with the experience of 
changing global political dynamics. 
   
 
The Committee of 24 to decolonization can be said to be predicated on a dogmatic philosophy of 
recognition. Its current criteria can be considered a ‘top-down’ or subsumptive approach to 
decolonization - in that ‘specific circumstances’ are ignored to fit NSGTs, if possible, into the 3 
fixed categories through recognition. This may have been appropriate seventy years ago but has 
become ill-suited to the multifarious and evolving experiences and understandings of self-
determination.  
It is no coincidence that Turner describes the process of delisting of NSGTs as only being 
granted through ‘one of three predetermined outcomes’ or the Committee of 24’s paramount 
problem as ‘dictating what their [NSGT] futures should entail.’ These are all characteristics of 
the anticipatory nature of the philosophy of recognition that imbues the Committee’s 
decolonization approach. In other words, the concepts, or more accurately here, categories of 
decolonization from Resolution 1541(XV) attempt to anticipate all different instantiations of 
decolonization. There may be variations within each of the three categories, but those 
differences are still contained within the broader genus of the foundational categories- 
independence, free association or integration. An example of self-government among the NSGTs 
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therefore, which doesn’t fit into these broad categories or their finer gradations- as an 
‘identifiable instance’ of the broader categories- simply does not get ‘recognised’ as a 
decolonized territory. This dogmatic philosophy of recognition, which prefigures the categories 
of decolonization, are problematic because many of the territories on the UN List of NSGTs have 
particularly high-levels of government- some akin to independent states- and some have often 
exercised plebiscites to maintain their current constitutional arrangements. 
A change in the epistemic approach of the Committee of 24, one which harnesses the primacy of 
the Encounter and dispenses with the dogmatic philosophy of recognitions inertia, would be 
able to establish sui generis categories of decolonization beyond the three recognised modus 
operandi. It would do this by identifying examples of decolonization not as identifiable instances 
of the 3 fixed categories, but through elevating the ‘specific circumstances’- to use Ban Ki-
Moon’s statement- of each NSGT. Indeed, it is no coincidence that this form of thinking for 
Deleuzians53 is referred to as creative, and that Ban-Ki Moon similarly pleads for ‘creative 
solutions’. Further, the Committee would do well to honour its 2016 annual report 
abovementioned, to facilitate ‘consultations with the administering Powers and other 
stakeholders regarding the status of the Non-Self-Governing Territories on the Committee’s 
agenda’. Through this dialogue, those ‘special circumstances’ may emerge that are able to 
challenge the inelasticity of the categories. Of the territories on the UN’s list which is 
particularly apt for committing this ‘metaphysical violence’ in establishing a sui generis 
decolonised status, is the territory of Gibraltar.  
4. Gibraltar and the ‘Fourth Option’ 
The problem confronting the Committee of 24 is in its limited conceptualisation of 
decolonization. These are satisfied only by instantiations of the three fixed categories in 
Resolution 1541(XV) which have been explained as predicated on a dogmatic philosophy of 
recognition. Anything which is not recognised, fails to be considered as decolonized and 
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subsequently delisted. This is problematic given that many territories on the UN’s list ought to 
be considered decolonized for the fact that they have levels of self-government akin to 
independent states or they have exercised plebiscites to maintain particular constitutional 
arrangements with an independent state. So long as the philosophy of recognition informs the 
Committee of 24’s decolonization strategy, the seventeen territories are likely to remain on the 
UN’s list. To be clear however, this paper is not articulating a conceptualisation of 
decolonization so broad that it captures territories that are clearly under colonial power but 
recognises that the concepts of decolonization are in need of revision through the establishment 
of a category which is open and sensitive to the particularities of the NSGTs. 
A. Broadening Self-Determination: The ’Fourth Option’ of decolonization 
A partial confusion exists in the decolonial vocabulary of International Law. This stems from the 
fact that terms such as ‘decolonization’, ‘self-determination’, ‘independence’, ‘self-government’ 
and so on, were either not initially defined, defined in reference to one another or defined 
tautologically.54 Self-Determination however, is the preeminent term in understanding the 
process toward decolonization. It was first mentioned in the UN Charter, Article 1(2), which 
proclaims the ‘respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’ and is 
mentioned again in Article 55 where it promotes international economic and social co-
operation on the basis of ‘equal rights and self-determination of peoples’. Further, it is also 
recognised in common Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966. Importantly, 
Resolution 1514(XV) focussed self-determination as part of the international law applicable to 
colonized territories (NSGT). Thus, it can be understood that decolonization is effected through 
self-determination. Indeed, in the Namibia Advisory Opinion,55 the International Court of Justice 
held that self-determination applied to all peoples in colonial territories and this was recognised 
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as part of customary international law in the Western Sahara Case.56 Consistent state practice 
from colonial powers57 and the absence of denial or contrary practice have confirmed, to some 
commentators58, that self-determination is jus cogens.  
The key scholastic discussions around self-determination have tended to focus on its scope 
(particularly as to whether it extends beyond non-colonial situations);59 what constitutes 
‘peoples’;60 the internal versus external dimensions of self-determination61 and whether it is a 
moral or legal principle- though this question has largely been settled by the Namibia Opinion 
and Western Sahara Case.62  Another key point of contention pertains to the limits on self-
determination particularly that of ‘territorial integrity’ and competing claims over a territory.63 
Though self-determination and decolonization may be considered as coterminous, self-
determination can more accurately be described as the umbrella term that captures the 
different modus operandi of decolonization. Resolution 1541(XV) therefore, recognised the 
different modus operandi of decolonization which are each examples of self-determination- free 
association, integration and independence. However, a broadening of the principle of self-
determination, through the addition of another modus operandi of decolonization, was to occur 
in October 1970.  
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The General Assembly adopted Resolution 2625(XXV)64 entitled the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations’. The Resolution reaffirmed the three conventional 
categories for decolonization but importantly, added the possibility that ‘the emergence into 
any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the 
right of self-determination by that people.’ This ‘fourth-option’65 has opened up the possibilities 
of decolonization (so as to make the options available open-ended) [including provision for] a 
closer relationship with the metropolitan power,66 presenting ‘more flexible options set out in 
Resolution 1541(XV)’.67   
Resolution 2625(XXV) and the fourth option, it is argued, appeared to develop the principle of 
self-determination and prefigured a pragmatic approach to decolonization that Ban Ki-Moon 
would later articulate to the Fourth Committee. This pragmatism, which is facilitated by the 
Resolution, can be explained through Deleuze’s notion of the Encounter. Far from being another 
‘fixed category’ predicated on a dogmatic philosophy of recognition, Resolution 2625(XXV) 
provides for the possibility of the primacy of the Encounter- or the opportunity for the ‘specific 
circumstances’ of the NSGTs to determine what constitutes decolonization. It expands the three 
fixed categories of decolonisation to enable a determination of decolonized status based on 
‘other political status freely determined’. This suggests that the ‘special circumstances’ are 
privileged over and above the three fixed categories. The word ‘other’ is especially prescient. It 
suggests that the possibilities of what constitutes colonialism are non-exhaustive. The 
Resolution does not try to specifically define- or anticipate as the other categories do- what 
‘other’ forms of decolonized statuses may look like. In other words, it elevates the ‘specific 
circumstances’ of the NSGT, providing it the opportunity to articulate what is meant by a 
decolonised status.  In effect, the Resolution recognises the unrecognised.  
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B. From Colonies to British Overseas Territories: the UKGibraltar and 
Other  and its NSGTs 
Since antiquity, Gibraltar has passed through Moorish, Spanish and now British hands- though 
Spanish claims to the territory continue and remain relevant in the legal (particularly 
constitutional), political and economic arrangements and governance of the territory.68 Despite 
Roman and Phoenician settlement in the surrounding Bay of Gibraltar, Muslim Moors from the 
Maghreb (North Africa, now principally Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) were the first 
architects of the territory in 711CE. The area formerly known as Mons Calpe was thus renamed 
‘Mountain of Tarik’ or Djebel Tarik in Arabic- the corrupted portmanteau of which forms the 
contemporary name of the territory- after the Muslims emerged victorious in what is known as 
the Battle of the Guadalete.69 Apart from a brief interruption in Muslim rule by King Ferdinand 
IV in 1309, it was not until 1462 that the Christian Reconquista recaptured Gibraltar. A 
comparatively short period of 240 years of rule under the Spanish- the shortest period of 
sovereignty over Gibraltar among the Muslims, Spain and the British, came to an end when the 
territory was ceded to Britain in 1713 through the Treaty of Utrecht70, following the Spanish 
War of Session.71 Today, Gibraltar is one of fourteen British Overseas Territory (BOT) 72 ten of 
which are considered NSGTs by the Committee of 24. There are seventeen NSGTs on the 
Committee of 24’s list. 
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Of the seventeen territories considered NSGTs, the UK is the administering power for 10 of 
them, though they refer to them as British Overseas Territories (‘BOTs’).73 The BOTs are 
remnants of the former British Empire and there continued status as such is due to the 
inhabitants’ wishes to remain under the sovereignty of the UK, the non-viability of 
independence, or because of the territories strategic value to the UK.74 The territories vary in 
their size, location and population and are constitutionally distinct from one another, having 
separate constitutions with specificities contingent to the circumstances and challenges of each 
territory.75 Common to all the BOTs is that they form part of the ‘Crown’s undivided realm’ ‘in 
the sense of government, power, ownership and belonging’.76 
Common to all the BOTs is that they form part of the ‘Crown’s undivided realm’ ‘in the sense of 
government, power, ownership and belonging’.77 To this effect, all the BOTs have a Governor or 
equivalent that ‘is appointed by the Crown, represents the Crown, and is responsible to the 
Crown’.78 Practically, this means that the BOTs do not have separate status from the UK for the 
purposes of international relations, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council sits as the apex 
court for all territories, the UK Parliament retains unlimited power to legislate for them and any 
reforms to the constitutions of the BOTs require amendment by the UK either through an Order 
in Council or an Act of Parliament. Generally, the Governor will often have ‘special 
responsibilities’ which allow him/her to exercise exclusive executive and legislative power in 
certain areas, typically relating to defence, internal security, external matters, and appointments 
to public office. In addition, other powers, either exercised by the Secretary of State or HM, 
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through reserve, disallowance or general legislative powers are par for the course in colonial, 
Commonwealth and BOT constitutionalism.79  
Self-determination however, appears to be at the heart of the UK’s intended relationship with its 
overseas territories. A root and branch effort to modernise all the UK’s BOTs began in 1997 
under the Labour government. Despite their colonial origins, the contemporary constitutional 
relationships between the UK and the 14 BOTs have been described by UK White Papers as a 
‘partnership’ and ‘forward-looking’,80 predicated on reciprocal ‘rights and responsibilities’.81 
The White Paper’s stated aim was to initiate and continue a modernisation process informed by 
the following 4 principles; self-determination, responsibilities and reciprocity, the 
encouragement of self-government and providing support for the BOTs in times of emergency. 
The 2012 Conservative-Lib Dem White Paper, The Overseas Territories: Security, Success and 
Sustainability, sought to reenergise Labour’s work on BOT modernisation. The coalition’s vision 
was for the BOTs to be ‘vibrant and flourishing communities’, reemphasising the 4 principles 
from the previous white paper, with particular attention paid to self-determination. The white 
paper also set up an annual forum for UK Ministers and BOT governments, the Joint Ministerial 
Council, as well as separate offices in each government department to ensure cross co-
ordination on policy rather than input being limited to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
The Joint Ministerial Council’s most recent 2016 Communique affirmed the importance of self-
determination and stated that ‘we agreed the need to continue our engagement on these issues 
to ensure that constitutional arrangements work effectively to promote the best interests of the 
Territories and of the UK’ and that it ‘will continue to support requests for the removal of the 
                                                             
79 Hakeem Yusuf, Colonial and Post-Colonial Constitutionalism in the Commonwealth: Peace, Order and 
Good Government (Routledge 2014); Hendry & Dickson, supra note 68 
80 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Partnership for Progress and Prosperity: Britain and the Overseas 
Territories (White Paper, Cm 4264 1999) 6 
81 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Overseas Territories: Security, Success and Sustainability (White 
Paper, Cm 8374 2012) 8 
23 
 
Territory from the United Nations list of non-self-governing territories, expressing more 
utterances toward a relationship of collegiality between the UK and its BOTs.82  
The British Overseas Territories Act 2002 was an important piece of UK legislation that sought to 
reflect a shift in Whitehall parlance by renaming the former Dependent Territories as Overseas 
Territories- a nod to many of the BOTs’ increasing self-government. However, notwithstanding 
this nomenclatural shift, it could be argued that the BOTs continue to be colonies pursuant to 
Schedule 1 of the Interpretation Act 1978: 
“Colony” means any part of Her Majesty’s dominions outside the British Islands 
except…territories for whose external relations a country other than the United 
Kingdom is responsible…and where parts of such dominions are under both a 
central and a local legislature, all parts under the central legislature are deemed 
for the purposes of this definition to be one colony. 
This acute binary however, in the determination of whether a BOT constitutes a NSGT or not, is 
symptomatic of the philosophy of recognition that underlies the Committee of 24 and masks a 
far more complex picture.83 This is because, though they may be legally defined as a colony for 
the purposes of UK law, many of the BOTs have very high levels of self-government akin to 
independent states. Further, some are able to commence, negotiate and conclude treaties and 
conduct external affairs largely on their own terms - an area typically the preserve of the 
imperial power in colonial constitutionalism.84 Most importantly, many BOTs have chosen to 
remain under UK sovereignty through various referenda. To claim that there is a colonial 
relationship therefore, is overly reductionist. It is now argued that many BOTs which are NSGTs 
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are on the precipice of establishing a sui generis decolonized status. One such example of a listed 
territory, and one which harnesses this complexity, is Gibraltar.  
C. Gibraltar at the UN  
It is particularly important to note the deliberate use of the term ‘toward’ in the title of this 
paper. This is to make clear that Gibraltar’s preparedness, in establishing a sui generis 
decolonized category in exercising its right of self-determination, is nascent but not currently 
fully formed. Whilst it has been argued elsewhere85 that Gibraltar is currently in a position to 
establish a sui generis category of decolonization, the establishment of such a category, this 
paper argues, is largely contingent on a series of reforms that would have to take place to 
precipitate de-listing. Still, Gibraltar situates itself well to establish this status because of the 
trajectory of its reform, the numerous referenda it has exercised in furtherance of its self-
determination and the inadequacies of the three fixed categories of decolonization in 
recognising its unique circumstances.  
As a British Overseas Territory, Gibraltar would appear to fall under the definition of a colony 
so-defined under UK Law. Indeed, the European Court of Justice, though recognising the 
separate constitutional status of Gibraltar, has referred to it as a British Crown Colony.86 
However, this only reveals part of a complex and multifaceted picture. The historical context of 
Gibraltar is imperative in explicating its singularity and why, therefore, it is appropriate for 
establishing a sui generis decolonized status. 
From as early as 1946, Gibraltar has been considered a NSGT and its continued listing by the 
Committee of 24 continues to make it a target of decolonisation by the UN. This compels the UK, 
as the administering power, to submit annual reports to the UN Secretariat under Article 73(e) 
of the UN Charter.  Meanwhile, subsequent to the Treaty of Utrecht, Spain has continued to 
make sovereignty claims over Gibraltar. Spanish sovereignty claims vary; from contending that 
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the Treaty of Utrecht was signed under duress87 to the claim that the Treaty was largely silent 
on the issue of sovereignty over certain parts of the territory. Perhaps most forcefully – and this 
is the position that has had most purchase at the UN and the Committee of 24 – is the claim that 
the alleged right (in the eye of the Spanish) of the Gibraltarians to self-determination constitutes 
an ‘attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a 
country’ which ‘is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations.’88 Put plainly, Spain claims the Gibraltarians do not constitute a ‘people’.  The 
‘territorial integrity’ argument has been largely accepted by the UN, who have repeatedly called 
for the decolonization of Gibraltar and a negotiated settlement between the British and Spain 89 
while largely ignoring the wishes of the Gibraltarians.90 Indeed, the most recent General 
Assembly Decision, taken on the recommendation of the Committee of 24, has continued to 
deny the Gibraltarian’s right to self-determination.91 
The ‘trump’ of territorial integrity is a misnomer, however. Such a limitation is only justifiable if 
‘external self-determination’ vis-à-vis independence is being sought after and in the absence of 
full ‘internal self-determination’, where a government represents the whole people of a territory 
without discrimination. Such a claim falls at the first hurdle as Gibraltar was acquired by the 
British through cession rather than conquest92 and therefore both the question of whether or 
not there is internal self-determination vis-à-vis Spain is redundant- as is the desire for 
independence (which Gibraltar has never raised).  
A more reasonable limitation on the Gibraltarian right to self-determination that the Spanish 
could have advanced is evidenced in the East Timor Case,93 in which there were competing 
claims over the territory which was colonised by the Portuguese and occupied by Indonesia. 
                                                             
87 Alistair Ward, España Britannia (Shepheard-Walwyn 2004) 123  
88 UNGA Res 1514 (1960) U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, para 6  
89 Gold, supra note 77, at 697-715 
90 Countless UN resolutions refer to ‘interests’ rather than ‘wishes’ of the Gibraltarians as it is claimed that 
the latter would be admission of the Gibraltarians right to self-determination under International law. See 
below.  
91UNGA Decision 69/523 (2015) 
92 Azopardi, supra note 79, at 20 
93 East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) [1995] ICJ Rep 6   
26 
 
The court however, recognised that the East Timorese had a right to self-determination. 
Further, the ‘consultation of the people of a territory awaiting decolonization’ was recognised 
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Western Sahara Case94 and competing claims, 
even though they maybe lawful, would not undermine the exercise of the right of self-
determination of the peoples. However, though some of the similarities may seem striking, 
Gibraltar has maintained time and time again its loyalty to Britain with no appetite for 
independence. Indeed whereas the contestation with East Timor seemed less clear cut, there 
can be no doubt that Gibraltar was ceded to the British in 1713.   
 
All of the current fixed categories of decolonization have proved inappropriate for Gibraltar. For 
example, independence has never been an option for the territory. It has for so long considered 
itself as British and, even in times of British ambivalence, has always maintained a desire to 
sustain its constitutional links with the UK. 95  There is also a legal problem presented by the 
Treaty of Utrecht which appears to give Spain the right of first refusal should Britain ever wish 
to transfer sovereignty of the territory.96 More pressingly, as a population of about 30,000 with 
its key markets in the EU and the UK, these links have been essential.97 Integration, at one point 
a popular resolution to the question of Gibraltar, particularly with the ascendency of the 
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Integration with Britain Party,  was refused by the British and put to bed in the Government’s 
1997 White Paper.98  
Elected representatives of Gibraltar have contended for some time, that they are not governed 
through a colonial arrangement by the UK. As early as Resolution 1514(XV), then Chief Minister 
of Gibraltar, Joshua Hassan, made representations to the UN to this effect while arguing for its 
self-determination.99 In the 1990s, the Chief Minister and Opposition leaders from Gibraltar 
made critical interventions to both the Committee of 24 and the Fourth Committee attempting 
to persuade them of Gibraltar’s right to self-determination. Ministers from Gibraltar also 
levelled criticism at the rigidity of the UN’s delisting criteria for NSGT under the three 
conventional modus operandi for decolonization.100 During the Anglo-Spanish 
intergovernmental Brussels talks over the question of Gibraltar, the territory was largely side-
lined. The then Chief Minister, Joe Bossano, boycotted the talks as they were predicated on 
sovereignty issues. However, Bossano continued to make representations to the UN of a ‘fourth-
option’ for Gibraltar, ensuring maximum self-government with the UK retaining formal 
sovereignty.101  
D. Contemporary Constitutionalism in Gibraltar: Toward a sui generis 
decolonised status  
High-levels of internal self-government which are ‘freely determined’– to borrow from 
Resolution 2625(XXV)102– has formed the basis of Gibraltar’s pursuit of the fourth option of 
decolonization. The framing of the resolution embraces the Deleuzian encounter given its 
potential for breaking down the dogmatic approach to decolonization currently stalling the 
work of the Committee of 24. Constitutional development in Gibraltar has been particularly 
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buoyant from around the mid-1940s.103 In 1999, the Gibraltar House of Assembly, set up a 
Select Committee on Constitutional Reform ‘to review all aspects of its old constitution, the 
Gibraltar Constitution Order 1969, and to report back to the House with its view on any 
desirable reform thereof’.104 The ‘approach and objective’ of the consultation sought to 
maximise self-government under the umbrella of British sovereignty as well as facilitate 
reforms that would result in the delisting of the territory from the UN List of NSGT. This was to 
be pursued through the ‘fourth option’ of self-determination.105 The committee submitted a 
draft Gibraltar Constitution Order 2001 as a series of amendments to the 1969 constitution 
which was then approved by the House of Assembly on 27 February 2002. Negotiations with the 
British Government took place between 2004 and 2006, concluding successfully in March of 
that year.  
 
As part of the process, then UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, informed the House of Commons 
that the approved constitution would be put to a referendum in Gibraltar.106 However, 
opposition parties in Gibraltar were not satisfied by the UK Government’s silence regarding the 
plebiscite on the nascent constitution being observed as an act of decolonisation. Further, there 
was significant diplomatic wrangling between the leader and opposition party in Gibraltar and 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office over the preamble which, in the draft, omitted any 
reference to self-determination. This was particularly unusual, given that the Labour 
government had previously committed to this principle in its 1999 white paper. The Gibraltar 
Constitution Committee proposed an amendment to the Foreign Secretary in April 2006 to the 
effect that the referendum would be deemed an act of self-determination but this was rejected 
by the British government. However, despite its absence from the draft constitution, the then 
Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, made clear that the referendum would be regarded 
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as an act of self-determination.107 60% of the Gibraltar electorate voted in favour of the new 
constitution ‘in exercise of [their] right to self-determination.’ 
Advances in Gibraltar’s constitution toward self-government, and thus decolonization vis-à-vis 
the fourth option are apparent and tangible. The Gibraltar Constitution Order 1969 had many of 
the hallmarks of a colonial constitution.108 For example, the Governor, as the Monarch’s 
representative, formed part of the legislature109 and elected ministers’ legislative competence 
had to lie within ‘defined domestic responsibilities’.110 If the determination of what constituted a 
‘defined domestic matter’ was contested, it was the Governor who would make the 
determination and an ouster clause meant that such decisions were precluded from review by 
the courts.111 Further, bills which were unlikely to be passed within these defined domestic 
responsibilities could be enacted by the Governor in the interests of the ‘financial and economic 
stability’ of the territory.112 The phraseology ‘financial and economic stability’, a nebulous term, 
was not constitutionally defined, effectively giving the Governor broad legislative powers. In 
addition, the Crown had a power to disallow bills,113 again, as was typical of colonial 
constitutionalism.  
Under the Gibraltar Constitution Order 2006, advances have been made to the effect of affording 
greater self-government for the territory. The Governor, as the representative of the UK 
monarch, is no longer constitutionally a part of the newly named legislature, ‘the Gibraltar 
Parliament’.114 Further, unlike in previous constitutions in Gibraltar, the responsibility of the 
Governor is now circumscribed,115 thus allotting the residual (and therefore broader) powers to 
the elected Ministers. Further, the British monarch no longer has the power to disallow 
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legislation. The powers of disallowance and the non-circumscription of Governor’s powers are 
emblematic of colonial constitutionalism and so their removal, set against the backdrop of self-
determination, is significant. This was a victory for the yearning for self-government.  
It is at this juncture that two key points need to be established. The first is to express a 
reservation that Gibraltar has yet reached the point at which it could be considered a 
decolonized territory under an open, sui generis fourth option. The second is that in spite of this 
however, Gibraltar is a clear contender to establish such a status in the prospect of further 
constitutional reforms. These both coalesce to underpin Gibraltar as gearing toward 
establishing a sui generis decolonized status.  These two points will now be developed. Gibraltar 
is yet to reach a point at which it could be said to have attained such level of self-government 
that it ought to be considered a decolonized territory under a newly established fourth option. 
Indeed, this would necessitate further constitutional review and reform.116 For example,117 as a 
constitution that is a product of the UK’s Royal Prerogative, its laws are considered ‘colonial 
laws’ for the purposes of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1856118 and thus it is susceptible to the 
‘doctrine of repugnancy’. The doctrine holds that colonial law which is contrary to provisions of 
a UK Act of Parliament extending to the ‘colonies’, or orders or regulations made under an Act, 
will result in the invalidation and inoperability of the colonial law.119  
 
 
Gibraltar is yet to reach a point at which it could be said to have attained such level of self-
government that it ought to be considered a decolonized territory under a newly established 
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fourth option. Indeed, this would necessitate further constitutional review and reform.120 For 
example,121 as a constitution that is a product of the UK’s Royal Prerogative, its laws are 
considered ‘colonial laws’ for the purposes of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1856122 and thus it is 
susceptible to the ‘doctrine of repugnancy’. The doctrine holds that colonial law which is 
contrary to provisions of a UK Act of Parliament extending to the ‘colonies’, or orders or 
regulations made under an Act, will result in the invalidation and inoperability of the colonial 
law.123  
Another issue, and one recognised by the Committee of 24s Secretariats Annual Working 
Paper,124 is the residual - or peace, order and good government power (‘POGG’) - of the UK 
Crown to legislate for the territory. POGG powers have been judicially interpreted to afford 
plenary legislative powers to the appointee125 and were controversially deployed to expel 
citizens from the British Indian Ocean Territory.126 Further, the Governor effectively has a 
power to withhold bills for the Crown’s signification if they are deemed repugnant to ‘good 
government’127- again a nebulous term- in addition to acting in accordance with Royal 
Instructions from HM in the exercise of his duties.128  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Gibraltar situation remains apt for establishing a new 
paradigm of decolonization which does not fit into one of the three fixed categories. Here, t5he 
Committee of 24 will benefit from adopting the Deleuze’s elucidation of the encounter to break 
down its self-limiting philosophy of recognition. This is for several reasons. First, despite the 
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concurrence of constitutional advances and regressions in its 2006 constitution, Gibraltar still 
operates a high-level of self-government, second perhaps only to Bermuda among the BOTs. 
Further, the preamble to both the 1966129 and 2006130 constitutions assure that Gibraltar will 
not pass under the sovereignty of another territory without the democratically expressed 
wishes of its citizens. In addition, the territory has exercised plebiscites under the auspices of 
self-determination on several occasions. As a precursor to its 1969 Constitution, Gibraltar held a 
referendum as to whether it should remain British or pass into Spanish sovereignty. The result- 
with a 95.8% turnout- returned an overwhelming 99.1% vote to remain under British 
Sovereignty. In 2002, when Labour’s then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw entertained the 
possibility of a joint sovereignty proposal between the UK and Spain, this was overwhelmingly 
rebuked in a 2002 referendum where 98.48% of Gibraltarians voted against it. Further, the 
2006 Constitution was approved by 60% of the Gibraltar electorate ‘in exercise of [their] right 
to self-determination.’  
The weight of the various referenda on self-determination in Gibraltar cannot be ignored. 
Ignoring them only reinforces the dogmatic philosophy of recognition that has not furthered the 
work of the Committee of 24 for several decades now and which puts its relevance, rtrahre 
ironically, into question. Though the UN condemned Gibraltar’s 1967 plebiscite through UN 
Resolution 2353(XXII),131 elsewhere it has accepted that they can be used to assess people’s 
desire as to their future. This was evidenced in the former British Togoland132 who voted 
whether they would remain a Trust Territory or become integrated into the Gold Coast upon the 
independence of Ghana. This example is particularly illuminating as it reveals the possibility of 
the UN to recognise plebiscites as an act of self-determination and, more broadly, the primacy of 
the Encounter as advanced by Deleuze. Most importantlyRelevantly too,  however, Gibraltar 
combines many features which are quintessentially not categorizable under the three fixed 
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categories. Indeed, one of the enduring themes of Gibraltar’s contemporary constitutional 
reform has been its overarching desire to maintain its constitutional links to the UK. This makes 
the three fixed categories, stymied by a dogmatic philosophy of recognition, impermeable to 
Gibraltar’s admission such that a sui generis open category is necessary. 
In sum, Deleuze’s Encounter enables us to postulate a process in which the Committee could, 
through elevating the ‘specific circumstances’ of each territory, establish an open, sui generis 
category of decolonization which acknowledges these issues among the currently listed 
territories. Gibraltar, as one example, is primed for such establishment of a fourth option or 
category, being resistant to categorisation under the current three fixed categories, while it 
embarks on a trajectory toward greater self-government, combined with its history of 
plebiscites. The suggestion therefore is not that Gibraltar has reached an empirically 
ascertainable point- which would warrant a review of its constitutional arrangements, far 
beyond the scope of this paper- in which to establish this sui generis category, but that certain 
reforms of its constitution would enable it to do so in the future.  
Overall, a revised understanding of decolonization in which primacy is given to the territories 
arrangements ought to presage further delisting and the eventual eradication of colonialism. 
This approach aligns with Deleuze’s epistemic offering for extricating the Committee of 24 from 
the current strait-jacket of dogmatic recognition of only certain categories of decolonization. A 
change in the epistemic approach of the Committee of 24, one which harnesses the primacy of 
the Encounter and dispenses with the dogmatic philosophy of recognition’s inertia, would be 
able to establish sui generis categories of decolonization beyond the three recognised modus 
operandi. It would do this by identifying examples of decolonization not as identifiable instances 
of the 3 fixed categories, but through elevating the ‘specific circumstances’- to use Ban Ki-
Moon’s statement- of each NSGT. Indeed, it is no coincidence that this form of thinking for 
Deleuzians133 is referred to as creative, and that Ban-Ki Moon similarly pleads for ‘creative 
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solutions’. Further, the Committee would do well to honour its 2016 annual report 
abovementioned, to facilitate ‘consultations with the administering Powers and other 
stakeholders regarding the status of the Non-Self-Governing Territories on the Committee’s 
agenda’. Through this dialogue, those ‘special circumstances’ may emerge that are able to 
challenge the inelasticity of the categories. 
 
 
5. Conclusion  
The Committee of 24 can no longer afford to maintain its current approach to decolonization, 
otherwise it stands accused for working against the very purpose of its creation, namely to 
advance the United Nations commitment to affording self-determination to extant colonial 
territories. There are therefore also issues of legitimacy at stake. As long as the Committee of 24 
continues on its current trajectory, it risks greater enmity from listed territories and their 
administering powers; further distancing itself and the UN at large from its operative functions 
and goals. The UN’s predilection toward the Spanish positions over Gibraltar requires review. 
The current approach of acceptance of the Spanish position which continues to deny the 
recognition of Gibraltar’s right to self-determination also merits interrogation. The recognition 
of Gibraltar’s right to self-determination is neither a discrete nor necessary precursor that 
would then enable the establishment of a new sui generis category. Rather, these two issues are 
intimately linked. Part of the Committee’s, and the UN generally, problem of overcoming the 
partiality toward Spanish claims requires unsettling the ossification of their arguments as to its 
territorial integrity. There is a need to look at the issue with fresh eyes, rather than 
regurgitating old General Assembly resolutions. Giving primacy to Gibraltar’s circumstances will 
unsettle the hardened assumptions over its status. Such an approach will facilitate the 
realisation of Ban Ki-Moon’s vision.    
